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THE SENSE OF DEITY AND BEGGING 
THE QUESTION WITH ONTOLOGICAL AND 
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
Daniel M. Johnson
Calvin famously interprets Romans 1 as ascribing human knowledge of God in 
nature not to inferences from created things (natural theology) but to a "sense 
of deity" that all people share and sinfully suppress. I want to suggest that the 
sense of deity interpretation actually provides the resources for explaining the 
persuasive power and usefulness of natural theology. Specifically, I will argue 
that understanding certain ontological and cosmological arguments as depen­
dent on the sense of deity preserves their ability to persuade while helping 
solve serious problems with the justification of their premises. In the case of 
the ontological argument, this will provide a new response to the most serious 
objection that the argument faces, the charge that it begs the question.
Calvin famously interprets Romans 1 as ascribing human knowledge of 
God in nature not to inferences from created things (natural theology) but 
to a "sense of deity" that all people share and sinfully suppress:
That there exists in the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, 
some sense of Deity, we hold to be beyond dispute, since God him­
self, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all 
men with some idea of his Godhead, the memory of which he con­
stantly renews and occasionally enlarges, that all to a man, being 
aware that there is a God, and that he is their Maker, may be con­
demned by their own conscience when they neither worship him nor 
consecrate their lives to his service.1
This interpretation, naturally, gives theistic arguments a different role to 
play in the theological enterprise than does the natural theology interpre­
tation, leading some Reformed theologians to dismiss natural theology 
altogether. I want to suggest that the sense of deity interpretation actually 
provides the resources for explaining the persuasive power and useful­
ness of natural theology. Specifically, I will argue that understanding cer­
tain ontological and cosmological arguments as dependent on the sense of 
deity preserves their ability to persuade while helping solve serious prob­
lems with the justification of their premises. In the case of the ontological *
John Calvin, Institutes o f the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), p. 43.
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argument, this will provide a new response to the most serious objection 
that the argument faces, the charge that it begs the question.
What is involved in the sense of deity? First, it generates non-inferential 
knowledge of God. Second, this knowledge is not a bare knowledge that 
God exists, but involves knowledge of his "eternal power and divine na­
ture" (Romans 1:20). Third, since the sense of deity is the basis on which pa­
gans, on Calvin's reading of Romans, can be held responsible for rejecting 
God, it involves actual knowledge which can be suppressed, not merely the 
potential for knowledge. ("Suppression" here can be cashed out in a num­
ber of ways, including self-deception or the straightforward removal of the 
belief.) Fourth, it is not simply a belief-generator, but a structural disposi­
tion to worship, which when suppressed is not effaced but turned toward 
idolatrous worship of created things. Fifth, the sense of deity is somehow 
mediated through created things, though that mediation is not inferential.2 
(The precise sense in which the SD is mediated, like the sense in which it is 
suppressed, is vague enough to be amenable to various accounts.)
Not all of these elements are equally important for the purposes of 
natural theology; the first three are the most essential, and the fourth is 
important just because it highlights the fact that the sense of deity never 
really stops pressing in on people even when suppressed.3 I am not trying 
to argue for these claims, but simply that if they are assumed, they pro­
vide a powerful account of the usefulness of natural theology.
The Ontological Argument
The ontological argument I will concern myself with is Plantinga's version 
of the modal argument:
(1) Possibly, a maximally great being exists.
(2) (Hence) a maximally great being exists (from 1, by S5).4
The conclusion follows from the premise, given the S5 modal axiom and 
a suitable definition of the property of "maximal greatness" involving 
necessary existence.5 There has been some debate over whether S5 is the 
correct system of modal logic, but by far the most significant objection to 
the argument has been the charge that it begs the question and is therefore 
useless. Consider the following modal disproof of God's existence:
2God's invisible qualities are "understood from what has been made" (Romans 
1:20).
3The ambiguity of the fifth point would become important in further develop­
ment of an epistemological theory of the sense of deity, because it allows for inter­
nalist interpretations as well as Plantinga's externalist interpretation.
4Alvin Plantinga, The Nature o f Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1974), chap. 10.
5The S5 modal axiom states that if anything is possibly necessary, then it is 
necessary. Any definition of maximal greatness that includes necessary existence 
is sufficient to run the argument (though necessary existence is usually accompa­
nied by other Anselmian great-making properties). By S5, if a necessary being is 
possible, then it is necessary—and hence actual.
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(1') Possibly, a maximally great being fails to exist.
(2') (Hence) there is no maximally great being (from 1, by S5).
There are also other parody arguments proving a whole host of necessary 
beings, not-quite-maximally great beings, and even devils.6 As it turns out, 
the possibility premises of some of these parody arguments are incompat­
ible with the possibility premise of the ontological argument, but it is hard 
to see why the possibility premise of the ontological argument should be 
favored over the others, without an antecedent commitment to the truth 
of the conclusion. There have been a number of attempts to respond to this 
objection either by adducing specific (often a posteriori) arguments for the 
truth of the controversial premise or by adducing general criteria which 
establish the truth or a presumption of the truth of the premise.7 A dif­
ferent sort of response, Plantinga's response, is to argue that even in the 
absence of independent support for the premise, the argument can still 
show that theistic belief is rational even though the argument is dialecti­
cally ineffective.8
The sense of deity can be employed to formulate an entirely different 
sort of solution to the problem. (This solution may at first appear blatantly 
question-begging, but this appearance will be cleared up shortly.) What­
ever else one thinks about modal epistemology, one surefire way for com­
ing to know possibility is by inferring it from actuality. My hypothesis is 
that I know that God possibly exists because I know that God actually exists 
(from the sense of deity), and possibility follows from actuality. Therefore, 
I know the premise by virtue of the sense of deity, and my justification 
for believing it depends on my prior justification for believing that God 
exists. This gives an account of my knowledge of the possibility premise
6See, for example, William Rowe, "The Ontological Argument and Question 
Begging," International Journal for Philosophy o f Religion 7:4 (1976a); Rowe, "Com­
ments on Professor Davis' 'Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?'" 
International Journal for Philosophy o f Religion 7:4 (1976b), pp. 443-447; and Michael 
Tooley, "Plantinga's Defense of the Ontological Argument," Mind 90 (1981), pp. 
422-427, among others.
7For examples of specific arguments for the premise utilizing a posteriori prem­
ises, see especially Alexander Pruss, "Samkara's Principle and Two Ontomystical 
Arguments," International Journal fo r Philosophy o f Religion 49 (2001), pp. 111-120; 
and Todd Buras and Michael Cantrell, "A Modal Argument From Desire," un­
published manuscript. For discussions of general criteria for judging possibility 
claims, see (among many others) Clement Dore, "The Possibility of God," Faith 
and Philosophy 1:2 (1984), pp. 303-315; and Michael Tooley, "Plantinga's Defense of 
the Ontological Argument," Mind 90 (1981), pp. 422-427. This discussion, like the 
parody strategy, is a staple of debate over ontological arguments, stretching back 
to Leibniz and past him to Scotus. These strategies for supporting the ontological 
argument are mirrored by similar strategies for supporting the possibility premise 
for the modal disproof of the existence of a maximally great being. See, for ex­
ample, David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980); J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" 
Mind 57 (1948), pp. 176-183; Tooley, "Plantinga's Defense"; and Richard Gale, On 
the Nature and Existence o f God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
8Plantinga, Nature o f Necessity
without having to come up with an (elusive) independent argument for 
the premise.
This effectively grants William Rowe his point that there is a certain 
sort of epistemic circularity in the argument, but I want to argue that it 
does not render the argument useless.9 Here's why. Our sinful suppression 
of the sense of deity is most unnatural (because sinful) and dramatically 
difficult (perhaps impossible) to do with consistency—as is seen from the 
fact that the structural disposition to worship never entirely goes away 
but is transformed into idolatry. It is therefore likely that we retain in our 
doxastic web beliefs that depend on belief in God, but which we have 
failed to remove from our web because we have failed (as a result of the 
sense of deity) to consistently doubt the existence of God. So the possibil­
ity premise may yet be accepted by someone who has only partially suc­
ceeded in suppressing his or her sense of deity. This doubter may have 
suspended judgment about or even disbelieved the existence of God while 
retaining a belief that God's existence is possible, despite having arrived 
at the possibility belief originally by virtue of the sense of deity. The onto­
logical argument may reasonably persuade such a person.
I will not try to untangle the knot that is the debate over what exactly 
the fallacy of "begging the question" amounts to. My own sense is that 
there are a number of loosely related ways in which an argument can be 
defective which all get lumped under the label of begging the question, 
and I'm willing to admit that the ontological argument may have one or 
more of these defects. (For instance, on my account it probably does beg 
the question in Rowe's "epistemic" sense—its ability to reasonably per­
suade depends on antecedent knowledge of the conclusion.)10 I'm merely 
arguing that what defects it has do not entail its uselessness, and that if 
Calvin is right about the sense of deity, the argument may be widely use­
ful. To be sure, the argument's usefulness will depend on the dialectical 
situation in which it is employed; it will be useful only when directed at 
those who have suppressed their belief in God but not their belief in God's 
possibility. The argument, then, does not rise to the level of a "proof," em­
ploying premises that all or nearly all people will endorse. This is not that 
much of a limitation, though, since nearly all philosophical arguments are 
of this sort.
There are three significant assumptions underlying this account. First, 
it assumes that at least some of those who doubt the existence of God do 
so either irrationally or through some non-rational process such as forget­
ting. This is because the argument is incapable of providing justification 
for belief in God that exceeds the original justification for that belief pro­
vided by the sense of deity, which means that the argument cannot ratio­
nally overcome evidence sufficient to defeat the justification provided by 
the sense of deity. Calvin would say that none of those who doubt God do 
so justifiably (that there is no evidence sufficient to rationally defeat the 
justification provided by the sense of deity), but my argument requires me
90 Faith and Philosophy
9Rowe, "Comments on Professor Davis."
10Ibid. However, see the discussion of the second assumption made by my ac­
count below; on some views of awareness requirements on knowledge, the argu­
ment may not even have this defect.
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to say only that some people doubt without justification and that the argu­
ment will be useful only when directed at these people. This is not a severe 
limitation, though, if the sense of deity provides strong justification.
Second, it assumes that it is rational to continue to believe something 
after having forgotten or rejected (or suppressed) the original ground for 
that belief.11 I do not remember where or when I learned the Pythagorean 
theorem, nor do I remember explicitly any situations in which I gained ex­
tra evidence for the truth of the theorem—but surely I still know that it is 
true. Many of my beliefs are like this. Consider the following case. I check 
into room 314 at a motel, and on the basis of this I make a mental note to 
myself that my room number is the first three digits of pi. Later, I forget my 
room number but remember that it is the first three digits of pi, and infer 
from that that my room number is 314. In this case I still had knowledge 
that my room number was the first three digits of pi even though I had for­
gotten the original ground for it (that the room number is 314), and I was 
able to use that knowledge to recover my lost knowledge of the original 
ground. Those views of knowledge that do not require me to have pres­
ent awareness of the reasons that my belief is based on (the ground of my 
belief) will have no problem accounting for this phenomenon. Even those 
epistemologists who argue that knowledge requires present awareness of 
the ground of my belief, though, will want to account for these sorts of 
cases by arguing that I actually do have a present ground for my belief 
which is different from the original ground, perhaps a sense of confidence 
in the belief. In this latter case, though, the ontological argument turns out 
to be totally impeccable, both noncircular and potentially dialectically ef­
fective, because my belief in God's possibility might have that same sort of 
present ground.* 12 Regardless of which view of present awareness require­
ments on knowledge we take, then, the ontological argument turns out 
to be potentially useful if Calvin is right about the sense of deity—either 
circular but reasonably persuasive or simply noncircular.13
UI owe both of the following examples to Alexander Pruss.
12I'm inclined to take this as an argument against such views of knowledge, be­
cause I think the arguments of the sort I've been describing are clearly circular, and 
such views cannot account for that circularity. My argument does not require this 
conclusion, however. Alternatively, if the suppression of the sense of deity is taken 
to be a kind of self-deception rather than outright removal of belief, then I don't 
actually lose belief in God when I suppress it. In this case, I would have a present 
ground (belief in God) for my belief (in God's possibility) that may satisfy some 
weak awareness or other internalist requirements, and the argument would serve 
to remove my self-deception rather than to create a new belief. This interpretation 
of suppression as self-deception is likely to be controversial, though, and the sup­
pressed beliefs still may not meet stricter awareness requirements on evidence. So 
I think my claim in the text—that if present awareness requirements on knowledge 
are true, then the ontological argument is altogether noncircular—will persuade 
more people who endorse such requirements than this way of allowing for aware­
ness requirements to be satisfied while still making the argument circular.
13Recall that if there aren't strong awareness requirements on knowledge, then 
the argument is circular because my justification to believe the premises depends 
on antecedent justification to believe the conclusion, but it is still reasonably per­
suasive, as the hotel case shows.
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Third, it assumes that the sense of deity includes an awareness of God 
either as a necessary being or as maximally great in such a way that en­
ables an inference to necessary existence. If I know that God exists from 
the sense of deity but I don't know that God is a necessary being or maxi­
mally great, then I am not entitled to infer from that a possibility premise 
sufficient to run a modal ontological argument. I think it very plausible to 
believe that necessary existence or maximal greatness is included, though, 
in the awareness of God's "eternal power and divine nature" that is in­
cluded in the sense of deity.
This way of accounting for the usefulness of the ontological argument 
is a curious one, considerably different from the strategies in the litera­
ture, because I really haven't given the doubter any more reason to accept 
the argument. Nor have I aided Plantinga's claim that the argument shows 
theistic belief to be rational, because my account assumes that Calvin is 
right about the sense of deity and so assumes that theistic belief is rational. 
What I have done is make a higher-level observation about the argument, 
that it may be useful in certain situations even without independent sup­
port. Because this is a meta-argument regarding the conditions in which 
the argument can be dialectically useful, the success of the ontological 
argument does not depend on the arguer being able to show that those 
conditions hold (that the sense of deity provides justification, and so on), 
but only that they do in fact hold. In other words, the arguer doesn't have 
to prove to his or her target that I am right about the argument; I only have 
to be actually right about the argument. My argument here is aimed, then, 
less at those who are trying to find out whether they should be persuaded 
by the ontological argument and more at those who are deciding whether 
the ontological argument is a legitimately useful argument to employ.
Notice that this does not rule out other strategies of supporting the pos­
sibility premise. After all, my beliefs can have a surplus of justification—it 
could be that I know that God possibly exists because I know (or knew) 
that he actually exists and because I have some independent reason for 
believing that he possibly exists, such that if I lose one source of justifica­
tion, I still have the other.
The sense of deity is not the only sort of thing that could enable the on­
tological argument's usefulness in the sense I've been developing, though 
I think that it would result in the most widespread usefulness for the ar­
gument and, given the success of Reformed epistemology in recent years, 
is perhaps the most plausible and likely to be true. Really, the ontological 
argument could be useful for anyone who comes to know that God ex­
ists and therefore that he possibly exists and who subsequently abandons 
(either unjustifiably or due to forgetfulness) the belief that God exists but 
retains the belief that he possibly exists. A religious experience which is 
forgotten or turned away from may create such a situation (and, indeed, 
the sense of deity can be construed as a kind of universal religious experi­
ence), or, though it is less likely, a previously accepted (sound) argument 
that is forgotten or wrongly rejected.
I have purposefully avoided committing myself to any particular 
model of how the sort of inference I've been describing—the recovery of 
lost knowledge by inference from knowledge based on that lost knowl­
edge—preserves rationality. I have shown that there are such rationality­
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preserving inferences (the hotel case shows this), and this is sufficient to 
argue that the ontological argument can be such an inference if Calvin 
is right about the sense of deity. Any model explaining the rationality of 
such inferences would be more doubtful than the fact that such inferences 
do exist and are rational, and so it would be counterproductive for me to 
commit to one.
The Cosmological Argument
The charge of begging the question is less often urged against cosmologi­
cal arguments employing the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), but it is 
not unheard of, and it is precisely the PSR that is the target.14 This charge, 
along with purported counterexamples to or undesirable consequences 
from the PSR, has motivated a series of defenses of the PSR and attempts 
to construct cosmological arguments employing weakened versions of 
the PSR.15 Even among those who accept the PSR, there is some difficulty 
in accounting for how we come to know it, assuming that it is true.16 The 
paradigm version of the PSR is the thesis that all contingent facts have 
an explanation.
It could be that we straightforwardly infer the PSR from our knowledge 
of God from the sense of deity. We know not only that God exists but his 
"eternal power and divine nature." The idea of God as sovereign creator 
of the world is likely contained in this knowledge of God's divine nature 
and power, which means that we know that all the contingent truths about 
the world are explained by God's activity, and so we know that they all 
require an explanation. This seems like an easy inference, and so it is plau­
sible to suppose that almost everybody makes this inference at some point 
(especially in light of the fact that the sense of deity presses on us every 
moment of our existence, and we are constantly struggling to suppress 
it).
The same observations regarding persuasive circular arguments apply 
here as in the case of the ontological argument. In fact, it may be that 
it is harder to suppress the PSR than the belief that God possibly exists, 
because of the ubiquitous use the PSR has in our everyday reasoning— 
which would help explain why the cosmological argument is tradition­
ally so much more persuasive than the ontological argument. So, instead 
of explaining my justification for the PSR in terms of its constitutive role
14See, for example, William Rowe, "The Cosmological Argument," Nous 5 
(1971), pp. 49-61.
15For defenses of the PSR, see Alexander Pruss, The Principle o f Sufficient Rea­
son: A Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Robert 
Koons, "Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument," in Oxford 
Studies in Philosophy o f Religion, Volume I, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming). For cosmological arguments employing weakened 
versions of the PSR, see Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss, "A New Cosmological 
Argument," Religious Studies 35 (1999), pp. 461-476; and Alexander Pruss, "A Re­
stricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Cosmological Argument," Religious 
Studies 40 (2004), pp. 165-179.
16See Robert Koons, "Epistemological Foundations" for an argument that some 
form of the PSR is known a priori.
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in everyday reasoning (which runs into problems with pragmatic justi­
fications for beliefs), I can explain my justification for the PSR in terms 
of the sense of deity and then explain the fact that the PSR is often not 
suppressed along with belief in God in terms of its constitutive role in 
everyday reasoning.
Again, I do not think this account is in competition with other attempts 
to support the PSR or to account for our knowledge of it. As before, it is 
possible for my beliefs to have a surplus of justification.
I'd like to take a look at one objection to my account.17 There are the- 
ists who don't believe the PSR (e.g., van Inwagen), and theists who don't 
believe that God is a necessary being in the modal sense (this was a com­
mon response to Findlay's modal disproof of the existence of God).18 How 
then can I say that the sense of deity allows knowledge of the PSR or the 
possibility premise of the ontological argument? I have a few things to 
say in response. First, anybody who thinks the relevant premises in the 
theistic arguments are false won't think that anybody can come to know 
them by any means, since knowledge entails truth. So my account of the 
role of the sense of deity in supporting these arguments will convince only 
those who think the premises are true—but that is all it is supposed to do, 
since as I said before my argument is a higher-level observation about the 
theistic arguments, not an independent case for the controversial prem­
ises in those arguments. Second, the mere fact that some theists disbelieve 
these premises doesn't say much about whether they can be reasonably 
inferred from the sense of deity, because many who believe that God ex­
ists may have come to that belief by other means than the sense of deity 
or may have resisted certain deliverances of or warranted inferences from 
the sense of deity (either irrationally—sin doesn't disappear in theists—or 
by virtue of obtaining defeaters for them). The existence of theists who 
disbelieve the premises of the arguments, therefore, doesn't mean that the 
premises can't be reasonably inferred from the sense of deity.
I conclude, then, that it is possible for the ontological and cosmological 
arguments to be dialectically effective even absent any independent sup­
port for their respective controversial premises—and that they probably 
will often have this effectiveness if Calvin is right about the sense of deity. 
Therefore, the sense of deity provides a different kind of response to the 
charge of begging the question leveled against the two arguments.19
Baylor University
17Due in part to an anonymous referee for this journal.
18Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?"
19Much thanks especially to Alexander Pruss, for a lot of discussion and encour­
agement. Thanks also to two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal for 
helpful feedback.
